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OVERLOOKED ISSUES IN THE "DILIGENT PROSECUTION" 
CITIZEN SUIT PRECLUSION 
Congress sought to attain full compliance with environmental statutes.' It 
reasoned that multiple enforcers would provide more comprehensive and 
effective enforcement than one enforcer. Congress therefore empowered the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the states and private citizens as 
enforcers of the statutes. However, Congress worried that successive actions 
by multiple enforcers could bring disruption and conflict to enforcement 
litigation and remedies. It therefore included in the citizen suit provision of each 
statute a limited, three-element notice, delay, and bar preclusion device to manage 
successive citizens' enforcement against the violations already subject to 
government enforcement.' The device generally bars citizens from enforcing if 
the government "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting" an action 
involving the same violations "to require compliance."~owever, Congress 
recognized that its goal of achieving full compliance by multiple enforcers and its 
* Professor of Law and Assc~iatc Dean for L'.nvironmental Law I'rograms, I'acc University 
School of IAW, White Plains, N.Y. This article is drawn from a more extcnsivc examination of 
preclusions of BPA and citizen enforcement actions conducted by the author and compiled in a two 
part, unpublished manuscript. See Jeffrey C;. Miller, Managing Conflict Among Successive 
Enforcement r\ctions by EPA, States and Citizens: Theme and Variation in Notice Delay, and Har 
Preclusions in Environmental Statutes (unpublished manuscript, on fdc with author). 'l'hc author 
thanks Lisa Jackson. Pace Law School LLM.'O2, for chaUcnging his preconceptions and making him 
reexamine the implications of the "to rccluk complhncc" lan~wagc of the ciuzcn suit bars. I-lc also 
thanks Sharon Hriddalsingh, Pace Law School LI..M. '02, for her thorough scrrch of the legislative 
history of the enforcement of c i h n  suit provisions and Erin Fhnapn, I'acc I aw School J.D. '05, 
for editorial commentary and assistance above and beyond expectations. 
1. ?be environmental statutes discussed in this article include: thc'roxic Substances (:ontrol 
Act (rSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); the (:ltrn Water Act ((:WI\), 33 U.S.C. §$ 1251-1387 
(2000); the Marine Protection, Itesearch, and Sanctuaries Act (Ml'ltS~l), 33 U.S.C. $9 1401-1445 
(2000); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. $9 300f-300j-26 (2000); the Resource 
(:onservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 US.(:. $9 6901-6992% (2000); the Clean Air Act (CAI\). 
42 U.S.C. $9 7401 -7671 q (2000); the Comprehensive E~lvironmend Response, Compecisation, and 
liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000); and the Emergency l'laaning and 
Community Right-To-Know Act (EKRA), 42 U.S.C. $8 11001-1 1050 (2000). 
2. Precluding successive citizen suits, of course, does not manage all conflict from successive 
enforcement, since government enforcers may also initiate successive enforcement. Part 11 of the 
author's unpublished manuscript, scc Miller, supra note *, examines statutory prcclusic~ns of 
successive EPA cnforccmcnt. 
3. The quoted lankwage is from section 304(b)(1)0;1) of thc (:A[\, 42 U.S.(:. § 7604@)(1)(H) 
(2000). The corresponding Iankuagc in the citizen suit provision of the other statutes is identical 
or  virtually identical. 
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subordinate goal of avoidlng dlsruption and confict from successive 
enforcement are in conflict. Congress resolved that confict by the balance it 
struck between them in the particular formulation of the preclusion device it used 
in each statute. 
Courts have considered nearly a dozen legal issues arising from the bar 
element in the preclusion device.' While many of these issues have been heavily 
litigated, two have gone relatively unnoticed. First, what did Congress intend 
when it lunited preclusive actions to actions the government "is diligently 
prosecuting'? Does use of the present tense mean that only continuing 
prosecutions bar citizen suits? The plain reading of the verb suggests so, 
although that reading greatly limits the operation of the preclusions. Second, 
what did Congress intend when it limited preclusive actions to those the 
government brought to require compliance? Does the focus on compliance 
mean that only actions to require defendants to cease and desist from violating 
the statutes bar citizen suits? Again, the plain readng of the phrase suggests so, 
although that reading also greatly h t s  the operation of the preclusions. Most 
courts interpreting the preclusions have used plain meaning and eqressio w n i ~ 3  
approaches to interpret the provisions, thereby respecting the balance Congress 
established between its goal of achieving full compliance through the efforts of 
multiple enforcers and its desire to avoid dlsruption and confict from successive 
enforcement. There is no reason to depart from that interpretation of the 
provisions for the two issues examined here. Indeed, the structure of the 
provisions and their legislative history supports that interpretation. 
The conclusion that the statutory preclusions bar citizen suits only in the face 
of ongoing government actions for compliance, however, may not always allow 
citizen suits to enforce in the face of concluded government actions that have not 
4. What "Administrator" may act to bar a citizen suit? What "State" may act to bar a citizcn 
suit? Where a statute specifies that only court actions bar a citizen suit, may other government 
actions bar it as well? Where a statute specifies that multiple government actions bar a citizen suit, 
may unspecified govcrnment actions bar it as well? Must the government commence all action 
prior to the citizen suit to bar it? When is a government action commenced? Must the govcrnmcnt 
action be ongoing to bar a citizen suit? I-low diligently must the government prosecute an ongoing 
action to bar a citizen suit? I Iow diligently must the government havc prosecuted a corlcludcd 
action to bar a citizen suit? What citizen actions may a government action bar? 'l'hcsc and other 
questions, together with more than one hundred twenty-five decisions attempting to answer thcm, 
are examined in the author's two-part manuscript, cited in rupro note *. 
5. WII.I.IAMN. ESKKID<;E,]R., I)YNAMI(:SI'A'~U'~ORY ~NI'DI~I~KEL'I \~ ' ION 323 (1 994) (citing 
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992) (plain mr-aning rule); IillOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (expnsrrio uniur); Chan v. Korean IYU Lines, lard., 490 U.S. 
122,132-33 (1989) (cxpnrrio uniu);Jett v. Dallas Indcp. Sch. Dist,  491 U.S. 701,732 (1989) (expnsrio 
rniur); United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988) (plain meaning rule)). 13skridgc 
places the plain meaning and the cxpnrrrio uniur catlo~ls first and second on his list of the canons as 
enunciated by the Rehnquist Court, dthough he does not state that he lists thcm in their order of 
importance. 
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achieved or never sought compliance. Common law doctrines may supplement 
the statutory preclusions. Res judicata, abstention and other related common law 
doctrines are designed to promote finality and to prevent disruption and confict 
from successive litigation. Courts have not yet determined the relationship 
between the statutory and common law preclusions. Moreover, they have 
applied the common law preclusions inconsistently and some of their 
applications may also shield violators from effective enforcement or even 
compliance with the law." 
Pollution control initially was left largely to the states. The federal role was 
primartly to fund research and state regulatory programs and to assist states in 
setting standards. However Congress completely revamped the federal 
environmental statutes in the 1970s to: increase the federal role in pollution 
control, provide strong federal enforcement authorities, and authorize citizen 
participation at all levels of the pollution control programs.' Finally, Congress 
expanded its new emphasis on citizen participation in implementing and 
enforcing the statutes to assure the transparency, and hopefully the effectiveness, 
of government implementing actions. To  assure more effective enforcement, it 
authorized citizen participation in enforcement through an ingenious new device, 
the citizen suit, adding members of the interested public, acting as "private 
attorneys general,"R to the existing federal and state environmental enforcement 
cadres. 
6. For an examination of the application of some of the doctrines in environmental 
enforcement cases beyond the scope of this article, scc W i a m  Daniel Henton. Appkration o/Res 
J~dcata nd Colhteral Estoppel to EPA Our$kng, 16 1G.C. ENVIL. Alil:. 1 . RI.N. 199 (1 988). 
7. 'Ihc House Report 011 the CWrI bcmoans the loss of  public trust in government and 
posits that such trust may be repined by enabling citircn participation in the regulatory process. 
It lists a variety of mcmurcs taken in the CWr\ to assure public 111 all aspects of 
implementing the statute, including the crmtion of the citiz~n suit mechanism. I1.li. lt13P. NO. 92- 
91 1, a t  132 (1 972), rrprintdin A LEGISLATIVEI-IISTORY OFVIE WKWR 1 ' 0 1 ~ ~ 1 ' 1 0 ~  (:0N'11101. ,\(.'I' 
AhfENDMENTs C)F 1972, at  819 (1973) fiereinafter 1972 Ltx;~sLA'~'rve I-IIS~OICY~. 
8. The I~Iouse Report on the CWA alluded to  the "private attorney gncral" doctrine 
developed in case law. Id at 134, qbtintcdin 1972 LEC;ISWITIVE I~ISIT)KY at 821. 'I'hc Court first 
referenced the "private attorney g n e n l "  c o n c q t  in Newman v. Piggc Park Entcrprizcs, Inc., 390 U.S. 
400, 402 (1968), and has used the term in discussing private enforcement of  environmental, 
antitrust, and civil rights statutes. I'rofessor Hucy traces the term back to  Judge Jerome I:rank. See 
Pamela Rucy, Private Justice (unpublished manuscript, on file with l'rofcssor Miller at l'ncc 
University School of Law). Scralro Middl~scx County Scwengc Auth. v. Nat'l Sca Clammcrs hss'n, 
453 U.S. 1, 14 11.23 (1981) (stating that Ml'RSA's review provisions arc open t o  "(alny person" 
acting as a "private attorneys general"') (citations omitted); Wcstfarm i\ssocs. I.td. 1"ship v. Int'l 
Fabricare lnst.,No. IIM-92-9.1992 W1.315188, at *4 (D. Md. May 6,1992) (allowingplairitiffs to  
pursue a claim for injunctive relief under RCIb\ as a "private attorneys general"). 
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More frequent enforcement by multiple enforcers, of course, carries with it the 
potential for successive, possibly disruptive and conficting, enforcement. T o  
manage potential disruption and confict, Congress developed a limited statutory 
preclusion on successive enforcement by citizens, incorporating three elements: 
a notice of violation; a delay between the notice and the commencement of 
citizen enforcement; and a bar on citizen enforcement if a government has 
already commenced an action against the same violations. Congress developed 
a range of alternatives for each element. For instance, it developed at least five 
alternative hutations for the bar element, specifying: the governments whose 
actions could be a bar, " the types of government actions that could be a bar, "' 
the degree of compliance required by a government action before it could be a 
bar, " how dihgently a government must prosecute its action to be a bar, I' and 
the particular successive actions a government action could bar." Congress 
developed similar ranges of alternatives for the other elements. The many 
possible combinations of the alternatives for each of the three elements 
constitute a nuanced device with a wide spectrum of possible effects on 
successive citizen enforcement. The issues examined in this article arise out of 
two of the limitations on the bar element. 
Although Congress developed five alternatives in the bar element, it never 
varied the wording in the citizen suit provisions of the "is. . .prosecuting" and "to 
require compliance" hutations in the bar. All of the statutes limit government 
actions that may bar a citizen suit to actions that the government: 1) 
<'. is.. .prosecuting" and 2) has brought and is prosecuting "to require 
c~mpliance."'~ This strongly suggests that Congress intended the bar in each 
9. Citizcn suit provisions in statutes that do not envision a state role in implcmcntation do 
not bar a citizen suit because of state action. See'fi(:r\ § 20(b)(l)(H), 15 U.S.C. § 26200(1)(H) 
(2000); MPRSA $ 105(&(2), 33 U.S.C. § 14150  (2000); EPCRA 5 316(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1 1046(d)(2) (2000). 
10. In some provisions, citizen suits arc barred by civil actions in court. See (:r\l\ 
§ 304(b)(l)(R). 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(H) (2000). In others, they are barred by civil or criminal 
actions in court See CWA $ 505@)(1)(H), 33 U.S.C. § 1365@)(1)(H) (2000). And, in still others, 
they arc barred by administrative cnforcemcnt actions. See '1?;(:1\ § 20@)(1)(H)), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 26200(1)(H). 
11. Compare CWI\ § 3090(6)(1\)(iii), 33 U.S.C. $1319(g)(6)(1\)(iii) (2000), which docs not 
require the government to scek compliance in its action to bar a citizen suit, with the other 
preclusions examined in this article. 
12. Compare CWI\ § 309(&(6)(1\)(i), 33 U.S.C. $ 1319@(6)(1\)(iii) (2000), which docs not 
rcquire the government to diligently prosecute its action to bar a citizen suit, with the other 
preclusions examined in this article. 
13. Compare CWA § 3090(6)(A)(ii, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iui (2000),which bars citizcn 
suits for civil penalties, with the other preclusions examined in this article. 
14. Only in section 3 0 9 0  of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 13190  (2000), did (:ongrcss apply the 
bar element to completed government prosecutions not seeking compbnce. I-lowcvcr, § 3 0 9 0  
is not in a citizen suit provision, emphasizing cven more the uniformity of the citizen suit provisions 
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statute to mean exactly what it says: with each alternative of the bar having a 
different meaning and the two constant limitations in the bar always having the 
same meaning. It also suggests that the two limitations mean exactly what they 
say: only present, on-going government prosecutions can bar citizen suits and 
only government prosecutions to require compliance can bar citizen suits. 
The Supreme Court has commented that the structure and wordng of the 
citizen suit provisions of the statutes are so s d a r  that Congress' use of the same 
or different terms in a particular provision is significant in interpretingit,l5 which 
is the proposition advanced in this article regardmg limitations on the preclusion 
device. The consistent use of the device and the limitations on it suggest and 
strengthen the applicability of several canons of statutory construction. First, of 
course, it suggests in pan' materio, i.e., "similar statutes should be interpreted 
but in a more sophisticated way. The sirmlarities and dlfferences in 
the wording of the device in the various provisions suggest that the sda r i t i e s  
be interpreted in the same manner and that the dlfferences be interpreted 
singularly. Beyond in pan materia, this pattern also suggests and strengthens the 
two most common canons of statutory construction, the plain meaning rule and 
expres~io unius, i.e., "folow the plain meaning of the statutory text" and 
"expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others."" Congress' 
consistent use of some terms in the preclusions and its varied use of others 
suggest that its use of words in the provisions was considered and expressive of 
its intent. Because the citizen suit provisions establish general enforcement 
jurisdiction and authorities and the preclusions establish exceptions to them, 
another over-arching canon of interpretation appears to be relevant to 
interpreting the preclusions, "~]rovisos and statutory exceptions should be read 
narrowly."'x This suggests the exception to the general jurisdiction for citizens 
in this regard. 
15. SccC;waltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chcsapz~kc Hay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,57 (1987) 
("(:onflcss used identical lankwage in the citizen suit provisions of several othcr cnvironmcnnl 
statutes that authorize only prospective relief. Moreover, (Iongress has dcmonstratcd in yet othcr 
statutory provisions that it knows how to avoid this prospective implication by using language that 
explicitly targets wholly past violations.") (citations omitted). The (:ourt found differences bctwccn 
the wording of citizen suit provisions in different statutes sigmificant and differences bctwccn the 
wording of similar provisions in the same statute "lcjven more on point." Id. at 57 11.2. 
16. ESKRIDGE,s@ranote 5,at 327 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 
(1992); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Fhght Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989); 
(:ommunications Workers of Am. v. Heck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Wimbcrly v. I ~ b o r  & Indus. 
Relations Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 51 1 (1987)). 
17. LSKRIDGE,SI~~M~O~~ 5,at 323 (citing 1Ltate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling(:(>., 505 U.S. 
469 (1992) (plain meaning rule); EEEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,499 U.S. 244 (1991) (cxpressiounius); 
(:hat1 v. Koran Air Lines. Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 132-33 (1989) ((rxprerrio uniw); Jctt v. I>aUas Indcp. 
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701,732 (1989) (rxpnsno unius); United States v. Providence Journal (:o., 485 
U.S. 693 (1988) (plain meaning rule)). 
18. ESKRIDGE, s e a  note 5, at 324 (citing Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726,739 (1989)). 
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to enforce, the preclusion device, should be interpreted narrowly to protect the 
general jurisdiction. A corollary to this canon would be that exceptions to 
exceptions should be construed broadly. This, in turn, suggests that 
"is.. .prosecuting" and "to require compliance," limitations on the preclusion 
device, should be interpreted broadly, again, to protect the general jurisdiction. 
A. Citizen Enforcement Provisions. All but one of the major statutes 
provide for citizen enforcement:'%ection 304 of the CAA,"' section 505 of the 
CWA," section 7002 of the RCRA," section 310 of the CERCLA,'%ection 20 
of the TSCA,'4 section 1419 of the SDWA,'j section 105(g) of the MPRSA,'" and 
section 326 of the EPCRA." These statutes authorize citizens to sue the EPA 
to require it to perform a duty mandated by the statute, a statutory mandamus 
action. They also authorize citizens to sue violating members of the regulated 
public. This article focuses on how the preclusions apply to the latter authority. 
All of the statutes authorize courts to issue injunctions requiring compliance and 
most authorize courts to assess civil penalties against violators.= Section 7002 
of the RCRA authorizes citizen suits to abate "imminent and substantial 
endangerment[s],"') a sort of statutory common law nuisance action, and 
authorizes citizens to enforce against some violations over which the EPA lacks 
authority." 
19. '171c I~edenl Insecticide, I:ungicidc, and Rodcnticidc ~ \ c t  (1':11:R1\), 7 US.(:. $§136-l36y 
(2000), contains no citizen suit authorization. 'I'his anomaly is probably explained by a diffcrcncc 
in congressional authorizing committee. All of the other statutes have at least one Scnatc or I-Iousc 
authorizing committee in common, c.g., the llouse Commerce (:ommittcc or the Scnatc 
Environment Committee. FIFRA's authorizing committee in both chambers is thc ~Igriculturc 
Committee. 
20. C h I  § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). 
21. CWA § 505,33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000). 
22. RCIU 5 7002,42 U.S.C. $6972 (2000). 
23. CERCLA § 310,42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2000). 
24. '~S(:I\ § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (2000). 
25. SDWA § 1419.42 U.S.C. $ 300;-8 (2000). 
26. MPRSA § 105@,33 U.S.(:. § 1415@ (2000). 
27. EPClLI § 326.42 U.S.C. $ 11046 (2000). 
28. For two examples of statutes authorizing courts to assess civil penalties ill citixcn suits, 
see CWA 5 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(;1) (2000) and MI'RSA § 105@(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1415@(5) 
(2000). 
29. RCIU § 7002(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(a)(l)@) (2000). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A) authorizes citizens to enforce against violations of the entire 
Act, while EPA's extensive enforcement powers under R C M  § 3008, 42 U.S.C. $ 6928 (2000) 
authorize it to enforce only against violations of Subchapter 111, the hazardous waste subchaptcr. 
EPtI's enforcement authority in Subchapter IV, the solid waste subchapter, is considerably more 
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1. Statutory bars in citizen suit provisions. The citizen suit provisions of 
the various environmental statutes are modeled on section 304 of the C M . 3 1  
Indeed, the citizen suit provisions in the different statutes are so nearly alike that 
courts commonly interpret one of them by comparing and contrasting its 
wording wid1 the wordng of others and by using legislative history and precedent 
from the others." Section 304 of the CAA contains a statutory preclusion with 
all three elements in a form followed closely by the citizen suit provisions in tile 
other statutes. It provides generally that: 
N o  action may be commenced . . . prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given 
notice of the violation [to the EPA, the State, and the violator], o r .  . . if [the EPA] 
or [the] State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court 
of the United States o r  a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, 
o r  order [sought to  be  enforced by the citizen] . . . .3' 
Under the notice and delay elements, citizens must gve the government the 
first opportunity to sue in c o ~ r t . ~  Under the bar element, citizens may not sue 
circumscribed incontrast to the citizen enforcement authority. Set K(:RI\ $4005(c)(2)(1\),42 U.S.(:. 
§ 6945(c)(2)(A) (2000). 
31. Hoth the Senate and I-louse CWA Reports acknowlcdg this fact. Sees. RI'~~,No. 92-414, 
at 79 (1971), npnntedin 1972 LEGISLK~VE I~ISTOHY at 1497 (stating that section 505 of the CWI\ 
is "modeled on the provision enacted in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970."); I-I.K. REI'. NO. 92- 
911, at 133 (1972), nprintdin 1972 IaEGISWIIVL.: I-IIS~ORY at 820 (stating that section 505 of the 
(:WA "closely follows the concepts utilized in section 304 of the Clmn Air Act."). Indccd, they arc 
so alike that the Senate Report on the citizen suit provision in the (:WA follows thc Senate R c ~ o r t  
on the citizen suit provision in the CAI\ almost paragraph by parakmph and word for word. 
CompanS. IiEP. No. 91-1 196, at 36-39 (1970), npnntcdin r\ LEGlSLA'nVE 1-IlSrollY O l ~ n  II:(:I.EAN 
A I R  t\MENI)MENTS OF 1970, at 436-39 (1974), wirh S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1971). nprinfedin 
1972 I,~c;ISLA'flvoI-IISTOltY at 1497-1500. 'I'his is particularly significant because the provision in 
the C t U  originated in the Senate bill with no counterpart in the tlousc bill. See I-1.R. REP. No. 91 - 
1783, 'cprintedin 1970 U.S.(:.C.I\.N. 5388. 
32. See United States Llcp't of Slncrky v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615-16 (1992) (providing 
comparable treatment to CWI\ and liCIL\ citizen suit provisions); C;waltncy of Smith field, I d .  v. 
Chesapc~kc Ray Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987) (comparing wording of section 505 of the 
CWA to citizen suit provisions of several other statutes); liallstrom v. 'l'illarnook County, 844 F.2d 
598,600 (9th Cir. 1987), afd,  493 U.S. 20 (1989) (comparing the citizcn suit provisions of the (:&I 
and RCRA); Friends of thc Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57,63 (2d Cir. 1985) (using the 
legislative history of the CAA citizen suit provision to interpret the (:Wr\ citizen suit provision); 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,702 11.55 O).(:. Cir. 1974) (same as Fticntlr 
ofthe Emth); Vernon Vill., 1nc. v. Gottier, 755 1:. Supp. 11 42,1147 O). Corm. 1990) (referring to the 
language of the CWr\ in interpreting the SDWI\ citizen suit provision); Roc v. Wert, 706 P. Supp. 
788,791 (W.D. Okla. 1989);Student l'ub. Interest Research Group ofN.J., Inc. v. I;ritzschc, Dodge 
& Olcott, Inc., 579 I;. Supp. 1528, 1534, n.8 (l1.N.J. 1984). aJ'd, 759 17.2d 1131 (3d (:u. 1985). 
33. CIL\ $ 304@)(1), 42 U.S.C. $7604@)(1) (2000). 
34. I\ few variations on thc notice and delay provision should bc notcd. 1\11 of the statutes 
require that citizens give notice to the EPA before suing it for failure to perform a mandatory duty. 
Heinonline - -  10 Widener L. Rev. 69 2003-2004 
70 IVidener Lcrw Review wol. 10:63 
if the government has taken that opportunity, i.e., has filed an action to require 
compliance and is &gently prosecuting it." The alternatives Congress 
developed for the bar element are identified above." The constant limitations on 
the bar, of course, are the "is . . . prosecuting" and the "to require compliance" 
phrasese3' 
Section 309(g) of the CWA, an EPA enforcement provision, also contains a 
preclusion on citizen and EPA enforcement. It is not a citizen suit authority, but 
its preclusion is a version of the same preclusion found in the citizen suit 
provisions. It is therefore examined after the following discussion of the 
legslative history of the citizen suit provisions. 
B. Legislative History. Because the citizen suit provisions are modeled 
upon section 304 of the CAA, courts commonly cite the legislative history of that 
section to determine the legislative intent of citizen suits under subsequently 
enacted statutes." Examination of the statutory preclusions in citizen suits 
therefore begins with the legislative hlstory of section 304 of the CAA and then 
proceeds to the legislative histories of citizen suit sections in other statutes, to the 
extent they provide additional illumination. Taken together, they indicate the 
overwhelming intent of Congress for citizen enforcement to provide both more 
enforcement and more effective enforcement by prodding the government to 
enforce, and enabling others to enforce when the government has failed to do so. 
Qualifying that purpose was a desire to assure that citizen enforcement did not 
unduly disrupt or conflict with government enforcement or harass violators. 
Although most of the statutes require a sixty-day dclay after notice bcforc a citizen may file suit 
against a violating polluter, section 7002@)(2)(A) of the RC1U rcquirts citizens to givc the 131'1\ 
a ninety-day delay before they may file a suit to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment. 
42 U.S.C. § 6972@)(2)(r\) (2000). C ~ I I  the other hand, many of the statutes do not require a delay 
period before citizens may sue for particular violations, often associated with hazardous substances, 
although prior notice must still be given. For instance, section 7002@)(2) of the It(:lL\ requires 
prior notice but no delay period for citizens fling complaints alleging violations of Subchapter 111, 
replating the treatment, storah*, and disposal of hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972@) (2000). 
See ah0 CWt\ § 505@), 33 U.S.C. § 1365@) (2000); (:A\ § 304@), 42 U.S.C. § 7 6 0 4 0  (2000). 
35. If the government filcs a preclusive action in fedcd court, howcvcr, a citizc~~ may 
intervene as a matter or right. See, e.g., (:I\I\ § 304@)(1)(H), 42 U.S.C. 8 76040(1)(H) (2000). Most 
of the citizen suit provisions in the other statutes include such intervention authority. Most allow 
"any citizcn" to intervene, although section 20@)(1)(H) of the 13C1\ and scctiocl 326(d)(2) of the 
EP<:lL\ qualify those who may intervene. See 15 U.S.C. § 26190(1)(H) (2000); 42 U.S.(:. 5 
1 1046@)(2) (2000). 
36. See Ivpra notes 10-14 and accompanyi~~g tcxt. 
37. Except as noted in the tcxt below, it is identical in the following statutes: '~S(:I\ 
§ 200(1)@), 15 U.S.C. § 2619('b)(l)@) (2000); CWA § 505@)(1)(H), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 @)(I)@) 
(2000); SDWA, § 1449@)(1)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 3001-8@)(1)@) (2000); RCIbI, § 70020(1)(H), 42 
US.<:. § 6972@)(1)@) (2000); and E P C M  § 326(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(e) (2000). 
38. See svpra note 33. 
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Section 304 of the CAA originated in the Senate bill and the House bill had no 
comparable pr~vision.~%rou~hout the legislative history in the Senate, a major 
goal of the provision was to encourage government enforcement'" in the hope 
of more and better enforcement ~veral l .~ '  Indeed, the Senate Reports for both 
the CAA and CWA emphasized that in bringng such actions "citizens would be 
performing a public service."" 
Opponents of section 304 of the C h A  were generally restrained. Rather than 
emphasizing concerns about environmentalists suing industry, they worried more 
about "imposing such a burden on the judlcial court system.""%owever, they 
did speculate that plaintiffs would bring vexatious lawsuits against industry to get 
attorney fee awards and that multiple citizen suits ag;unst the EPA would 
dissipate agency resources and divert its attention from its appointed tasks." 
Reflecting these concerns, the Conference Committee strengthened the notice 
and delay elements of the preclusion, added the diligent government prosecution 
bar, and amended the attorney fee provision to allow an award to defendants as 
well as plaintiffs, when appropriate. 
Congress intended citizen suits as a goad to government enforcement. The 
very purpose of the notice requirement was to "prod" or "trigger" government 
enforcement." However, for some violations, although the provisions require 
39. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1783, at 55, npnntcdin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5388. 
40. 'Ibis was the case with the original Senate bill, which provided only 30 days prior noticc 
and had no enforcement bar if the government did commence suit. 'I'hc Senate Iteport 
accompanying this bill stated that "[a]uthorizing citizens t o  bring suits . . . should motivate 
governmental agencies.. . to bringenforcement and abatement proceedings." S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, 
at 36-37 (1970), npnntedin I\ LEGISLATIVE 1-IISTORY 01;'fllE (:LIMN I\IK AMDND~~EN'IS  0 1 ;  1970, 
at 436-37 (1974). The thirty-day notice r~yuircment was intended to "further encourage and 
provide for agency enforcement" by giving the government agency "an opportunity to act on the 
alleged violation." Id at 37. It was the rationale for expanding the required noticc t o  60 Jays and 
imposing a bar on citizen suits if the government did enforce within that pkriod. "l'l'lo further 
encourahr, and provide for agency enforcement, the Committee has added Ithc noticc and delay 
requiremcntl." Id Senator Muskic commented that the noticc might "triggvr" administrative 
action. 116 CCINC. REC. 32,927 (1970). Senator I-lart commented that the notice would have the 
"effect o f  prodding" government enforcement. 116 (:ON(;. RIX. 33,104 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Ihrt). 
41. Again, Scnator Muskie remarked, "(:itkens can be a useful instrument for detecting 
violations and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies'and courts alike." 116 
CONC REC. 32,927 (1970). He also commented that. "Although the Senate did not advocate these 
suits as  the best way to  achieve enforcement, it was C I L ~  that they should be an effective tool.'' 1 16 
CONC. REC. 42,382 (1970). 
42. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 38, npnnfcdin I\ l.riGlS~.AlIVl? I-IISCORY OP' f l - I I I  (:LI':AN J \ I I <  
A~~ENDMENTS OP 1970, at 438 (1974); S. Rli11. N o .  92-414, at 81 (1972), rcprintcd in 1972 
LEGISLATIVE I-IISI'ORY at 1499. 
43. 116 (:ONG. ltn:. 32,926 (1970). 
44. Id 
45. Senator Muskie remarked that the purpose of  noticc was to  "trigger" government action 
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citizens to gve notice, they do not require a delay period before citizens may file 
their  complaint^.'^ Under those circumstances, the citizen suit notice is less likely 
to prod government enforcement. The legslative history also emphasizes that 
not all government enforcement actions will bar a citizen suit. "mf the citizen 
believed efforts initiated by the agency to be inadequate, the citizen might choose 
to f i e  the action. . . . mf the court viewed the agency action as inadequate, it 
would have jurisdiction to consider the citizen action notwithstanding any 
pendmg agency action."" If an agency does commence enforcement actions 
during the delay period, it "must prosecute them in good faith and with deliberate 
speed . . . or the citizen is free to initiate his action."'" Thus, Congress clld not 
intend that the preclusions eliminate all successive enforcement by  citizen^.^" 
The  legislative history of section 505 of the CWA is similar to that of the 
CAA. Indeed, the Senate CWA Report commentary followed the Senate CAA 
Report almost paragraph-by-paragraph and line-by-line.'" The CWA Report 
added, "[ilt is the Committee's intent that . . . citizens should be unconstrained 
to bring these actions, and that the courts should not hesitate to consider 
them."51 It is in the legislative history of the CWA provision that Congress 
anointed a citizen enforcer as a "private attorney general," believing the citizen 
suit provision "provides an open door for those who have legitimate interests in 
the courts, and encourages more meaningful participation in the adrmnistrative 
proce~ses ."~~ 
A later Senate Committee Report commented: 
Citizen suits are a proven enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intended-to 
both spur and supplement to government enforcement actions. They have 
deterred violators and achieved significant compliance gains. In the past two years, 
the number of citizen suits to enforce [CWA] permits has surged so that such suits 
to bring about compliance. 116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970). Senator Hart remarked that notice will 
have the "effect of prodding" government enforcement. 11 6 CON(;. REC. 33,104 (1 970). 'I'he delay 
between the citizen's notice and when the d b c n  can file suit should give the jpvcmmcnt c~~forcer 
"an opportunity to act on  thc alleged violation." S. REP. N o .  91-1196, at 37, nprinfed in I\ 
1,eclsLnnvo HISTORY OFTIIE C 1 . u ~  ,\in I\MI~NUMENTS 0 1 ;  1970, at 437 (1974). 
46. See sqbm note 34. 
47. S. REI? NO. 91-1 196, at 37, nprnted in A LEGISMI'IVI:. -Iln'oRy OF 'rlrr;. (:I.I:AN 1\111 
AMENDMENTSOF 1970, at 437 (1974). 
48. Id at 65,nprintedtn1\ LEGISLA~I'IVOI-IISIT)RYOI;IIIECI.DANAII~I\MEND~IIIN'~OI~~~~O, 
at 465 (1974). 
49. Successive enforcement actions are contemplated in several situations: if theg~,vernment 
action was commenced after the citizen suit; if the government action is not being dilikwntly 
prosecuted; and if, under some statutes, the government action is not in court. 
50. Coqan S. REP. N o .  91-1 196, at 36-39, @tinted in h LI~GLISLflIVE 1 lISl'ol<~ Oli'ri 
CI.EAN AIR AMENDMENTS 0 1 2  1970, at 436-39 (1974). with S. Rlil'. NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1971). 
nprintedin 1972 LEGISLATIVE I-IISTORY at 1497-1500. 
51. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80, nprintedin 1972 LnGIsLAnvn 1-IKK)Rv at 1498. 
52. H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 134, nprintcdin 1972 LOGISLI\'L'IVE HISroIIY at 821. 
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now constitute a substantial portion of all enforcement actions filed in Federal 
court under this Act." 
Others have commented that the legislative history of the provisions is in 
confhct, on the one hand expansive, favoring citizen enforcement, and on the 
other hand, restrictive, fearing it.% However, the legislative history is more 
complex. It suggests Congress did not have a single intent in enacting the citizen 
suit provisions, but rather it intended the provisions to serve several purposes. 
One clear purpose was to be a vehicle for citizen participation in government, 
with its broader goals of providtng transparency and openness in government in 
turn promoting public ownership of and trust in government. Another purpose 
was to assure compliance with environmental statutes by encouraging 
government enforcement. Another was to provide default enforcers when the 
government chose not to enforce or lacked the resources to do so. Indeed, 
Congress came to see citizen suits as an effective tool in that regard, performing 
a substantial role in the total enforcement effort. It admonished courts to be 
receptive to citizen suits, recognizing that citizen enforcers performed a public 
service. Qualifying these purposes was the congressional desire that citizen suits 
not unduly interfere or confhct with government actions or unduly harass 
violators. Concluding that Congress had a single intent in enacting the provisions 
ignores much of their legislative hstory. Elevating the desire that citizen suits 
not unduly interfere or conflict with government actions from a h t e d  after 
thought to a primary purpose of the provisions ignores the very purpose of the 
provisions. 
C. Statutory Preclusions in Section 309(g) of the CWA. Congress added 
section 3 0 9 0  to the CWA in 1987, authorizing the EPA to assess administrative 
penalties against violators of the statute. I t  was one of three amendments 
intended to strengthen the EPA enforcement provisi~n.'~ However, the 
authority was a limited one. Whereas courts may order compliance and assess 
penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation per day, the EPA may only assess 
penalties and may do so in amounts totaling only $25,000 or $125,000, depending 
on the formality of the administrative process it uses.j"o prevent duplicative 
penalties for the same violations, Congress included a preclusion provision. It 
provides that "any violation . . . shall not be subject of a civil penalty action" by 
the EPA or a citizen iE 
53. S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985), nptintedin<:~~~\N WATER A(:~'Ahil'.~l)hil!~'~s 0 1 ;  1985, 
at 28 (1985). 
54. Robcrt D. Snook, Environmental Citipn Suits and Ahinistrative Dismtion: When Should 
Government Enfomment Bma Gtipn Suit? NA'I'. ENVTI, IJNI;ORCEMENT J. ,  3 11.64.4-6. 
55. See I~edenl Water I'ollution (:ontrol Act ~\mcndments, l'uli. Id. NO. 100-4, 8% 312-314, 
101 Stat. 7,42-46 (1987) (incrc%sing thc mounts  of civil penalties courts may assess, adding a nc:w 
and severe criminal sanction for violations the actor knows place people in danger of  serious injury, 
and adding EPIZ'S administrative penalty authority). 
56. CWA 8 309(d), @(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), M(2) (2000). 
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(i) . . . [theEPA] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an actioil under tlis 
subsection, (ii) . . . a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action 
under a State law comparable to this subsection, or (iii) . . . [the EPA or a State] has 
issued a final order . . . and the violator has paid a penalty assessed under this 
subsection, or such comparable State law . . . ." 
The subsection contains a version of the same three-element preclusion device 
found throughout the statutes. Many of the terms it uses are identical to terms 
used in the other provisions, i.e., "is diligently prosecuting." Significantly, 
however, it adds a preclusion for actions that are final and does not limit the 
preclusion to actions being prosecuted "to require compliance," as do the 
preclusions in the citizen suit provisions. The Supreme Court suggested section 
3090 wording that differs from wording in the citizen suit sections warrants a 
different interpretation.'" 
The legislative history of section 309(g) emphasizes that it is to be used for 
minor violations not warranting serious enforcement effort.'"t recounts that 
Congress built explicit citizen participation authorities into the penalty 
assessment process, including intervention and judicial review, to assure that 
EPA did not misuse the pro~ision.~ '  It s fear of misuse was not that EPA would 
assess too many penalties, but that it would assess minor penalties for serious 
violations more appropriate for injunctive relief and large penalties. The 
legislative history indicated the purpose for the preclusion was to prevent the 
assessment of duplicative penalties for the same violation, with no mention of 
preserving the government's authority to enforce without the hindrance of a 
simultaneous citizen suit." That is in great contrast to the purpose of the 
preclusion in the citizen suit provisions, enunciated in their legislative history, to 
preserve the government's authority to do just that.6' 
57. CWA § 309@(6)(A). 33 U.S.C. Ej 1319@(6)(/\) (2000). liPA may assess penalties up to 
$25,000 using informal proceedings, and up to $1 25,000 using formal adjudicative procccdinp, 
under the Administrative I'rrxcdurc Act, 5 U.S.C. $9 551-706 (2000). 
58. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. (:hesape;lkc Ray Found.. Inc.. 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987) 
(stating that because section 505 of the CW,\ authorizes citizens to sue those allchwd to "be in 
violation" of the Act, while section 309@ authorizes the Bl'A to assess penaltics apinst a person 
who  "has violated" the Act, violations must be continuing to support a citizen suit, while the IZi'h 
. . 
may "target1 ] wholly past violations"). 
59. S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 27 (1985), npnnledin CLEAN WATDKACI'AMONDMI!N'J'S 01' 1985, 
at 27 (1985). 
60. Id at 26-29. 
61. Mat  28. 
62. See discussion s@m Part I.H. 
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There is considerable literature on citizen suits, with pioneering efforts dating 
back to the mid-1980s." Some of t l ~ e  more recent literature focuses on the 
statutory bars to citizen suits generally,"although much of it focuses on the 
statutory bars in sections 309(g) and 505 of the CWA. None of the literature 
examines the two issues dscussed here. 
The preclusion provisions answer most questions directly and explicitly. They 
specify which government entities may act to bar citizen suits, and which 
government actions may bar citizen suits. They also specify that the government 
must commence one of those actions before the commencement of the citizen 
suit to bar i t  The preclusion provisions do not define "is diligently prosecuting," 
but they illuminate its meaning by linking it to requiring compliance. Finally, they 
indicate that government actions may bar citizen suits insofar as they seek 
compliance with the same requirements. Legislative history supports interpreting 
the provisions in accordance with their plain language. Congress' development 
of the preclusion device with many nuanced variations for all three of its 
elements, but constant use of the "is . . . prosecuting" and "to require 
compliance" limitations on the bar is a strong indication that Congress meant the 
words it used to be given their plain meaning. Most courts interpret the 
provisions in accordance with their plain language. 
A. Must the Government's Action be Ongoing to Preclude a Citizen 
Suit? The meaning of "is diligently prosecuting" raises two general issues. First, 
must prosecution of the action be ongoing to bar a citizen suit? Second, what is 
required for the prosecution to be ddigent? While the second issue is beyond the 
-- - - - 
63. See, e.g., Harry Boyer & Err<$ Meidiager, Privatifng RquLtoy Enfomment: A Pmkminaty 
Assessment ofCitip Suits U n h  Fehmt EnvimnmentalLmYs, 34 HUFF. I,. REV. 833 (1 985); Jeffrey C;. 
Miller, Private Enfomment of Fehrat Pot/ufion ContmlLLIws Part 1, 13 I : .NV~. .  1 . RI~I,. 10,309 (1983). 
Jeffrey C;. Miller, Priuate Enfonement ojFhrdPotlution C o n t m l ~ s  Part I1,14 I ~ N V I ~ . .  I . It~il'. 10,063 
(1984); Jeffrey G. Miller, Priuafe Enjonement ofFedmlPoUution ContmlLorvs Part 111. 14 L{NVll- I.. 
REP. 10,407 (1984). Treatises on envuonmcnd law commonly devote considcrablc attention t o  
citizen suits. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM I-I. ROGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENI'AL LAW: I-IAZAKDOUS WASrLS 
AND SUBSTANCES (1992). There have been at least two treatises on citizen suits: MI(:IIAEL D.
AXLINE,ENVIRONMENTALC~TIZENSUITS (3d cd. 1995);JEPFREYC;. MILLER&ENVIZ. l.hW INSr., 
CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE NFORCEMENT 01: I:EDEML POLLUTION (:ONTROL LAWS (1987). 
64. See Dcrck Dickinson, Notc, I s  "Dibient Pmsecution ofrn Action in a Cou~i"Rcqui~dto Pnrmpt 
Citizen Suits U n h  the Major F e h a l  Envimnmentat Statutes?, 38 WM. & MARY L. Rriv. 1 545 (1997); 
Itoss Macfarlai~e & Lori 'Terry, Citixen Suits: Impacts on Pcmlting and Ageng Enfomment, 1 I NA'~: 
ItlsouRcEs & ENVY 20 (1997); Rarry S. Ncuman & Jeffrey A. Knight, Wbcn A m  Clean Water Act 
Citizen Suits Pncluhd by Government Enjomment Actions?. 30 1ZNVl3.. I,. ltlil'. 10.1 11 (2000); I-lcuthcr 
I.,. Maples, Notc, Rcfoming ]uLn'atlnte'pntation ofthe Dihient Pmsecufion Bar Ensuring an Effective C i t i p  
Rob in Achimnng the Goah ofthe Clcan Water Act, 16 \'A. ENVi?.. 1 ,J . 195 (1 996). 
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scope of this article, the answer to the fist  issue may affect the answer to the 
second.(" 
Preclusion comes about if the government "has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a[n] . . . action . . . to require compliance."(' "Has commenced," in 
the past tense, is separated by one word from "is . . . prosecuting," in the present 
tense. The close proximity and juxtaposition of the verbs, only a conjunction 
apart, is strong evidence that Congress intended the tense difference and hence 
that a prosecution must be commenced before the citizen suit is filed and must 
be on-going when the citizen suit is filed to bar to the citizen suit. This 
interpretation is supported by the plain meaning and expressio nnius canons of 
interpretation; by specifying that continuing prosecutions may be preclusive, the 
provisions provide that concluded prosecutions may not be." "To require 
compliance" reinforces this conclusion, for it suggests that a preclusive 
government action is one in which compliance has yet to be achieved and hence 
that a concluded government action is not preclusive, for conduded government 
enforcement actions should lead to compliance."" Modifymg "is. . . prosecuting" 
with "diligently" adds to the strength of this interpretation. "Diligent" means 
"characterized by steady, earnest, and energetic eff~rt."~'' Asking whether a 
prosecution is ddtgent inquires more into the energy put into an ongoing process 
than into the results or success of a conduded process; once the case is 
concluded, no more energy is put into it. 
The structure of the CWA suggests that Congress intentionally used the 
present tense "is diligently prosecuting" in the citizen suit provision. When 
Congress added section 3090(6)(A) to the statute in 1987, it barred successive 
EPA and citizen actions for penalties both when the EPA or a state "is diligently 
prosecuting" a section 3 0 9 0  penalty action and also when one of them "bus 
issued' a final penalty order and the violator " h a  paid' a penalty.7" This 
juxtaposition of tenses in a similar context re-emphasizes that Congress knows 
the difference between ongoing and completed actions, that it used different verb 
tenses deliberately, and that it meant the differences to have meaning. This re- 
65. For instmce,if concluded actions could bar citizen suits, whether an action was diligently 
prosecuted might suggest an examination of the results of the prosecution. If only on-going actions 
can bar a citizen suit however, whcthcr an action is diligently prosecuted suggests at1 inquiry into 
the energy put into the prosecution and the speed with which the prosecutor seeks to  move thc 
action through the courts. 
66. See, e.g., (:IU § 304@)(1)(B)), 42 U.S.C. § 7604@)(1)(H) (2000) (emphasis added). 
67. See s@m notes 17-1 8 and accompanying text. 
68. For instance, sectioil 309(a)(l) and (a)(3) of the CWI\ authorizes the I:l1A to issue 
administrative orders against a violator "requiring such prson to comply."~\lthough the Supreme 
Court held in Weinberger v. ltomcro-Harcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). that courts exercise their 
traditional equitable powcrs in deciding whether to issue prohibitory injunctions under section 309 
of the CWA for violations of the Act, they are neverthclr3s to assure that violators comply. 
69. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DI(TIONARY 325 (10th rd. 1999). 
70. CWA 5 309@(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 131 9@(6)(1\) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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emphasis is underscored by congressional knowledge of the linkage between 
sections 3 0 9 0  and 505, for it cross-referenced each section in the other. When 
Congress amended section 505 to cross reference the preclusion in section 
3 0 9 0 ,  it did not disturb the juxtaposed tenses in section 505(b), inhcating its 
intent to let the meaning of the different tenses stand. 
Indeed, the legislative history underlines the deliberate nature of the 
congressional choice to use the present tense in the citizen suit preclusion 
provisions. The CAA Conference Committee Report and the House CWA 
Report both stated that a citizen suit is barred if a government "abatement action 
ispending and is being a?ligent~pur~ued."~' The Senate CAA and CWA Reports both 
contain sindar language.72 This, of course, reinforces that the legislative intent 
in using the present tense "is dhgently prosecuting" was to denote on-going 
prosecution. The Senate Report had the same notion in mind when it stated that 
government agencies must prosecute enforcement actions "in good faith and 
with deliberate speed. . . or the citizen is free to initiate his action."'" 
Application of the preclusion provisions only when there is an on-going 
government prosecution makes policy sense, for the likelihood of dsruption and 
confict from successive prosecution is greatest when two enforcement actions 
for prospective relief are proceeding simultaneously. Once the government's 
action is concluded, the potential for dsruption and confict in judcial 
proceedings is over. The likelihood that resolution of successive citizen suits will 
disrupt or conflict with the resolution of the earlier government action is minimal 
for several reasons. First, the doctrines of mootness or res jirdicata may 
d~rninate.~'  Second, courts believing that the continuing citizen action is 
duplicative and of no benefit may inform plaintiffs they will not award attorney 
fees if they persist in pursuing their cause of action." Third, courts may take the 
resolution of the earlier government action into account when framing a remedy 
in the subsequently resolved citizen suit. Indeed, penalties the defendant has 
already paid for the same violations in the concluded case are one of such 
71. H.R. Iter. No. 91-1783, at 56 (1970), qbrintcd in 1970 U.S.(:.(:.l\.N. 5388 (emphasis 
added); H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 133 (1972). qbrintcd in 1972 LI!CISLI\'I'IVI:. I-IISroKY at  820 
(emphasis added). 
72. "[llf the court virtwcd the ahwncy action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to 
consider the citizen action nonvithsmnding any pcndng agency action." S. REP. NU. 91 -1 196, at 37 
(1970), ~printcdin A LECLISLA~VE HIS~ORY <)P'I'~.IE CLEAN AIR I\~~UNDMEN'IS 0 1 2  1970, at 437 
(1974) (emphasis added); S. Rep. NO. 92-414, at 80, qbrintcdin 1972 I,ECISLA'I'~VL:.~~IIS~~)I~Y at 1498 
(emphasis added). 
73. S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 65, npintcd in I\ l.nc;!sL~nvn I-IISTORY o P  'I'I 11;. (:l.l:hN I\IK 
I\MENI~MENTS 01; 1970, at 465 (1974). 
74. SCC Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. l i d l aw Ilnvtl. Scrvs. (TO(:). Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Hetter Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); <;waltncy of Smithfield, 1-td. v. 
(:hrsapeake Hay Pound., Inc.. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
75. Scc ~\ t l .  States Legal I+und., Inc. v. K c ~ h  Ref. Co., 681 1:. Supp. 609 (1). Minn. 1988). 
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"matters as justice may requirew7& the court must take into account in assessing 
penalties in the citizen If the penalties settled for or awarded in the 
concluded government action were insufficient to deter future violations by the 
defendant or others, the award of additional penalties in the successive citizen 
action serves the statutory deterrence purpose and does not rob the government 
from the benefit of its settlement. Similarly, compliance measures the defendant 
has already been ordered to take for the same violations in the concluded case are 
equitable factors the court must take into account in framing a compliance 
injunction in the citizen action. Of course, if the resolution of the concluded 
government action did not require compliance, a compliance injunction in the 
successive citizen action serves the statutory purpose and does not rob the 
government of the benefit of its ~e t t lement .~~ 
Although citizen suits do not rob the government of the benefit of its 
previous settlements, violators argue the ability of citizens to "overfile" 
government actions will deter violators from settling with the government, 
making it harder for the government to  enforce.'"^ argument is empirically 
unsound, for violators settle cases d d y  with federal and state enforcers without 
knowing whether citizen plaintiffs will subsequently file suit. The argument 
presupposes that citizen enforcement threatens violators as much as government 
enforcement, which is not the case. When citizens take action ag;unst a violator, 
they can seek only civil penalties and an injunction. When the government takes 
actions against a violator, it too can seek civil penalties and an injunction, but it 
can also can take many other actions, including but not limited to: subjecting the 
violator to frequent and intrusive inspections, revoking or denying the violator's 
permits or making them subject to difficult conditions, proceeding criminally 
against the violator, its officers and employees, and barring the violator from 
government contracts." To suggest that violators will not reach administrative 
and civil settlement with the government because of possible action by citizens 
is preposterous in light of the draconian power the government has over 
violators who do not settle with it. 
Not surprisingly, courts have routinely interpreted the citizen suit provisions 
in general and their preclusion bar elements in particular to give meaning to the 
tenses Congress used in them. Many of them note that the Supreme Court, in 
Gwaltney .fSmi#hfield, Ltd v. Chesapeake Buy Founddion, Inc.,'" based its decision that 
section 505 of the CWA conferred no jurisdiction for a citizen suit to enforce 
76. l'his is one of the factors courts arc to  considcr in determining the amount o f  pcnaltics 
to assess. See for instance, section 309(d) of the (:WI\, 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (2000). 
77. Srv, for cxample, CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.(:. § 1319(d) (2000). undcr which CWI\ citizc~~ 
suit pcndties arc assessed. 
78. Weinberger v. llomcro-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1 982). 
79. See Snook, swpm notc 54, at 11; Macfarlane & 'l'crry. rupra notc 64, at 25. 
80. See, for instance, CWA sections 308,309(c), 401@)(l)(c) and 508. 
81. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
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agains t  wholly past violations on the  present  tense "alleged to be in violation" in 
sec t ion  505(a)(l). The Court 's primary method of interpret ing the phrase  was  the 
plain mean ing  of the tense Congress  used in it. 
T h e  most natural reading of "to be in violation" is a requirement that citizen- 
plaintiffs allege a state o f  either continuous o r  ultermitteilt violation-that is, a 
reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future. 
Congress could have phrased its requirement in language that looked to the past 
("to have violated"), but it did not choose this readily available optiorl. 
m h e  prospective orientation of that phrase could not  have escaped Congress' 
attention. . . . Congress has demonstrated in yet other statutory provisioils that it 
knows how to  avoid this prospective implication by using language that explicitly 
targets wholly past violations." 
The Court's admonition to give meaning to t h e  tenses used in section 505(a))'s 
l imitat ion on citizen enforcement authority applies equally t o  in terpre t ing  section 
505@)'s preclusion on tha t  authori ty and t o  interpret ing comparab le  citizen sui t  
provis ions  in other statutes. A l m o s t  all o f  t h e  many courts consider ing the "has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" language have reasoned tha t  Congress' 
u s e  of the  past tense " h a  commenced '  was  deliberate, is significant, a n d  shou ld  
be in terpre ted  in accordance  with its plain meaning to hold tha t  on ly  g o v e r n m e n t  
actions fled before citizen suits will bar them.g Similarly, all b u t  one of the few 
82. Gwaknry, 484 U.S. at 57 (citations omitted). 
83. Chesapeake Hay Found. v. Am. Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 208-09 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(refusing to barn citizen suit where state action was fded three and a half hours after the citixcn suit 
was filed); Old 'rimer, Inc. v. Hlackhawk-Cent. (:icy Sanitation Dist., 51 1;. Supp. 2d 1109.11 14-1 5 
(D. Colo. 1999) (refusing to bar a citizen suit brought under section 309@(6)(ii) of the <:WI\ wlicre 
a statc administrative p n d t y  assessment was commcclced after commcclccmcnt of (:W1\ citizcn 
suit); Long Island Soundkecpr Fund, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Unvtl. l'rot., 27 1:. Supp. 2d 
380,383 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to bar a citizcn suit where a statc action was filcd half an hour 
aftcr the citizen suit was filed); Hriw & Stratton Gorp. v. <:oncrctc Sales & Scrvs., 20 1:. Supp. 2d 
1356,1373-74 (h4.D. Ga. 1998) (refusing to bar a citizen suit undcr the IIClU where the citizen suit 
was commenced before a sa te  consent order); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Gorp., 894 1;. 
Supp. 1029,1034-35 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (indicating that a sate action must be pending whcn a citizcn 
suit is filed to bar it); Natural 1Ls. Def. Council, lnc. v. Loewcngart & Co., 776 F. Supp. 996,1000 
(M.D. Pa. 1991) (finding CWA citizcn suit not preempted by hter hmvernment initiative agminst 
defendant); l'ub. Interest Research Group v. Yatcs Indus., 757 17. Supp. 438, 444 (l1.N.J. 1991) 
(stating that subsequent administrative action does not preempt a citizen suit);Sicrm <:lub v. United 
States Dep't of Energy, 734 F. Supp. 946, 950, 952 (D. Colo. 1990) (finding a citizcn suit undcr 
R C l U  not precluded by an administntivc compliance order that was "indefinite ia many rcspccts"); 
Chesapeake Ray Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Gorp., 652 1;. Supp. 620.625-26 03. Md. 1987); 
Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Job I'lating Co.. 623 1;. Supp. 207, 215 0). (:on11. 1985) (finding a 
(:WI\ citizen suit not precluded by state agency enforcement action started aftcr thc citixcn suit was 
filcd); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 61 7 1:. Supp. 1120, 1126 01. Md. 1985). afd,  847 Ii.2d 
1109 (4th Cir. 1988); Hrewer v. City of Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519,527-28 03.D. 'l'cnn. 1983). 
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courts considering the language have reasoned that Congress' use of the present 
tense "is prosecutingnwas deliberate, is significant, and should be interpreted in 
accordance with its plain meaning to hold that only government actions on-going 
at the time citizen suits are fded u d  bar them."' 
The district court in Fr iend  of'the Earth, Inc. v. L i d h  Environmentul Services 
(TOC), Inc.,"j is the only court to explicitly reach a contrary result. It doubted that 
Congress intended the meanings of the tenses it used, for doing so would allow 
the preclusion ag;unst citizen suits erected by an on-going dhgently prosecuted 
government action to dissolve once the prosecution was concluded, thus allowing 
citizens to evade the preclusion by simply waiting unul t l~e government's action 
is concluded, a result it considered senseless.""e court failed to note that its 
conclusion led to a senseless result. Why would Congress authorize citizens to 
file suit when the government had already commenced an action but was not 
&gently prosecutingit, only to later bar the citizens from concluding their action 
because the government had concluded its action in an non-ddigent and 
unsatisfactory manner? The most likely answer to these two questions is that 
Congress intended an on-going government action to bar citizen suits only if the 
government is diligently prosecuting the action and for a settled government 
action to bar citizen suits only if the government settled for compliance or a 
penalty adequate to provide deterrence. 
The court admtted its decision was contrary to the plain meaning of the 
statutory language." The court did not examine the legislative history, discussed 
above, that supports the plain meaning of the statutory language. The only 
justification the court gave for its decision was that it thought an opposite result 
was ~ense less .~  The opposite result, however, is supported by the policy reasons 
examined above. They indlcate Congress was more concerned with avoidmg 
conflict between two on-going court proceedings than with avoiding conflicting 
resolutions of two enforcement actions. As explained above, successive citizen 
suits have only a small chance of interfering with the results the government 
obtained in a concluded action. Moreover, if successive citizen suits interfere 
84. Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 83 V.3d 11 11, 11 18 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(construing section 3 0 9 0  of the CWA); A-(1 ltcorpnizntion 'Trust v. 1l.l. Dul'ont l l c  Ncmours 
& (:(A, 968 F. Supp. 423,432 (13.D. Wis. 1997); (;laxer v. Am. Ecoloby Envtl. Scrvs. Coq,., 894 P. 
Supp. 1029, 1034 (E.D. 'l'cx. 1995) (construing scction 304 of the CAI\ and scction 7002 of thc 
I tCM); Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. (;,\I; Gorp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D.N.J. 1991) 
(construing section 3 0 9 0  of thc (;WI\); (:onn. 1:und for the Ihv't v. (:ontnct I'iating (lo., 631 1;. 
Supp. 1291,1293 (D. Conn. 1986) (construing section 505 o f  the (:WI\); (:onn. I;und for the I<nv't 
v. I. & W Indus., Inc., 631 1:. Supp. 1289, 1291 (D. Corm. 1986) (construing scction 505 of thc 
CWA). 
85. 890 P. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995), uacatcd~ 149 P.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), nu'd, 528 U.S. 167 
(2000). 
86. Id at 485. 
87. Id 
88. Id 
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with the ability of violators to carry out their obligations under concluded 
government actions, courts may apply a variety of common law doctrines to 
prevent the c~nflict.~' Indeed, the court in Lai&w noted that if the statutory bar 
ceased when the government action was concluded, duplicative suits might still 
be avoided under the doctrine of resjudicrtu. But that could not be considered in 
the case, because the defendant had not plead resjudicutu as a defense and both 
parties argued it I d  not apply."" Congressional awareness of common law 
preclusions"' to prevent disruptive successive suits could explain why it used the 
present tense "is . . . prosecuting." But that would lead to the question, why 
would Congress intend that citizen suits be allowed to proceed while the 
government pursued its action without dilligency, only to be barred by common 
law preclusions once the government concluded its action in an equally 
unsatisfactory manner? Congress could not have intended that result. In any 
event, the court's interpretation was dlcta, because the court found the 
government's prosecution had not been diligent in settling for too small a penalty 
and therefore did not preclude a citizen suit. 
Few courts have addressed this issue. Perhaps the citizen plaintiffs did not 
argue the present tense of "is . . . prosecuting" means the preclusion stop 
operating once a prosecution ends. Perhaps the argument did not occur to them. 
O r  perhaps they did not want to raise it, fearing common law resjudicutu or issue 
preclusion defenses would follow. 
Assuming that "is diligently prosecuting" requires that the government 
prosecution be ongoing to bar a citizen suit, what is an ongoing prosecution? 
The most obvious answer is that an action that has been commenced by filing a 
complaint and not yet concluded by a dispositive ruling, decision on the merits, 
o r  court-entered consent decree (or under some statutes their administrative 
analogues) and is not on appeal, is in the adjudication process and therefore is 
ongoing. The difficult question is whether an action that has been concluded by 
an order is st111 ongoing when the- order contains a schedule requiring the 
defendant to perform actions in the future. If the coirt has issued an injunction 
o r  approved a negotiated consent decree requiring comphance in accordance with 
a schedule, it is tempting to say the action is still pendlng and the citizen is barred 
89. See United Statrs v. Card ,  Inc.. 508 1'. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). 
90. L n ' h ,  890 F. Supp. at 485-86 n.7. Indeed, the court asked the parties to brief the issue, 
raising two intriguing questions: (i) why did thc court ask the parties to brief the issue when the 
defendant had not plead res judicata as n defense under FED. R. CIV. 1'. 8(c); and (ii) why did thc 
defendant argue the order the state had p n c  to considerable trouble to get didn't support rcs 
judicata? 
91. 'The Senate Rcports on both the (:,\A and CWr\ notc that if courts found government 
enforcement adequate, they could suspend, dismiss, or consolidate the citizen suit, evidently 
referencing stays, abstention, res judicata, m d  other common law preclusions. SeeS. 1t1<1>. No. 91- 
11 96, at 37, npintcdin 1\ LEGls12~l.lvli I.IKlr)lw ol;n 11; (:I,I!AN I \ I I ~  ~\LII~NDLIRN'IS 0 1 7  1970, at 
437 (1974); S. IWP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), tipinfedin 1972 LL(;ISLI\TIVC 1 IISr<)ltY at 1498. 
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from suing if the prosecutor is diligently monitoring compliance with the order 
and seehng to enforce it when the defendant fails to do so. Indeed, many," but 
not all," courts considering the matter have so held. The minority view, 
however, appears to have more merit. Monitoring compliance with a decree is 
not action in court. When the prosecutor seeks court help to enforce a decree, 
she really is enforcing against a violation of the court's order in a contempt 
proceeding, not against a violation of the statute in an enforcement action; that 
prosecution has been completed." Indeed, Congress recognized the distinction 
by authorizing citizen enforcement against violations of both the statute and 
orders enforcing the statute." The issue becomes considerably murkier when the 
order is administrative rather than judicial and was reached by agreement rather 
than as a result of administrative process. The typical pattern of administrative 
action in which the issue arises is the issuance of an administrative compliance 
order by consent, followed by several extensions of the compliance date at  the 
request of the violator, all without any administrative adjudication. As 
92. For instance, when a twenty page consent decree established, in detail, work to be 
performed and standards to be met by the work, the state agency's monitoring of compliance with 
the work schedule was held to be continuing and diligent prosecution in City ofHeath v. AshlannOil, 
Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971,983 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Sccalro Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. I-Icalth & Cmty. 
Dev. Group v. City of (:ambridge, 115 P. Supp. 2d 550,557 (D. Md. 2000) (holding late compliance 
of consent decree to be diligent prosccution undcr scction 3 0 9 0  of the (:WI\). 
93. (:onlition for I I d t h  Concern v. I.WD, Inc., 834 1'. Supp. 953,956 (W.D. Ky. 1993), nu'd 
on othergmnnk, 60 P.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 1995); I'ub, Interest Ihsarch Group, Inc. v. Witco (:hem. 
Corp., CIV. No. 89-3146.1990 WIa 661 78 at *4-5 (l1.N.J. May 17,1990) (finding state participation 
in overseeing the implementation of remedial action by the defendant, under a stipulation ending 
administrative enforcement, was not diligent prosecution undcr section 309M of the (:WI\); 
Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. C;corgia-Pacific Gorp., 615 F. Supp. 1419,1431-32 
(D.N.J. 1985) (finding a post-consent decree of administrative surveillance was not action in court 
that would bara citizen suit); Imve v. N.Y. State Ilep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 1'. Supp. 832, 
843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (refusing to bara citizen suit where the state failed to enforce an order to 
comply with a permit). 
94. In Connccn'c~~tFundforth~Envimnmentu. L & Wlnhstries, Inc, 631 F. Supp. 1289,1291 (1). 
Conn. 1986), the court commented that modification of a consent decree was not cvidcncc of 
diligent prosecution. 
95. I h c  citizcn suit provisions generally authorize suit apinst violation of thc statutc or an 
order enforcing the statute. For example, section 505(a)(1)@) of the (:Wi\, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(a)(l)@) (2000), authorizes suit against violation of a standard or limitation undcr the statutc 
or  "an order issued by the Vl'A] or [the] Statc with respect to such a standard or limitation." 
Further, section 7002(a)(l)(r\) of the RClL\, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000), authorizes citizen 
suits against violation of an "order which has become cffectivc" under the RClL\. 'I'his statutc has 
been held to  authorize atizen enforcement of administrative and judicial orders. See O ' l ~ 3 r y  v. 
Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807,815 11.5 (E.D. Pa. 1988). BIltsccCulbertson v. Coats Am., 
Inc., 913 I;. Supp. 1572, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (stating that citizens may not enforcc apinst 
violations of  administrative orders under section 3 0 9 0  of the CWA). 
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"prosecuting" denotes an ongoing adjudication, this pattern of administrative 
behavior does not fit it. 
B. Must the Government Action Require Compliance? Does it? T o  bar 
a citizen suit, the provisions specify that the government action must be 
commenced and diligently prosecuted "to require compliance." The plain 
meaning of the term is to coerce the defendant to cease violating the requirement 
being enforced. Actions of a non-coercive nature or chrected at simply penalizing 
past violations, as opposed to addressing or deterring present and future 
violations do not fit within this p h n  meaning. When Congress intended non- 
coercive actions to bar successive enforcement, it did not include "to require 
compliance," i.e., in section 3 0 9 0  of the CWA. This emphasizes not only the 
significance of including "to require compliance" where it appears, but also of the 
different nature of the preclusion in section 309Cg), which authorizes only modest 
penalties that are not enough in many cases to deter violations. 
The legislative history a f h s  Congress used the term "to require compliance" 
intentionally and with meaning. The House and Senate Reports accompanying 
the CAA and CWA citizen suit provisions stated that commencement and 
diligent prosecution of "abatement actions" by the government would preclude 
citizen suits.""ndeed, the Senate CAA bill, containing the prototype citizen suit 
provision," required prior notice by the citizen to "afford [the government the 
opportunity] . . . to institute enforcement proceedings . . . to abate such alleged 
violation . . . ."'R "Abate" is defined as "to put an end to . . . ."" The plain 
meaning of abatement in the legislative history is the cessation of the violation. 
The Senate Report made it clear that the citizen plaintiff and ultimately the court 
were to make a judgment whether a government action met this test. . 
p]f the citizen believed efforts initiated by the agency to be inadequate, the citizen 
might choose to file the action. In such case, the courts would be expected to 
consider the petition against the background of the agency action and could 
determine that such action would be adequate to justifj~ suspension, dismissal, or 
consolidation of the citizen petition. On the other hand, if the court viewed the 
agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to consider the citizen action 
notwithstanding any pending agency action.""' 
96. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 133 (1972), trprintedin 1972 LEGlSLlmVo I-IISTCORY at  820 
(stating that a citizen suit may be precluded "if an abatement action is pending and is bcingdiligently 
pursued"); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), w n t l r t l i n  1972 LEGlSMIlVE 14IsTC)RY at 1498 (stating 
that a citizen suit may not be precluded "if the agency h d  not initiated abatement prcxecdings"). 
97. See j@ra notes 71-72 and accompanying tcxt. 
98. S. 4358,91st (:on& at 84-85 (1970), trprintedin A LEGISLA'L'IVII I1ISIT)RY 01;'L'I ll'. <:I.ISAN 
AIR I \ ~ ~ E N D ~ I E N T S  1970, at 614-1 5 (1974). 
99. MERKIA~I-WEDSL'OR'S (:OIJ,IIGII\'~'II DI(IL'IONARY 1 (10th cd. 1999). 
100. S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 37 (1970), nprintedin I\ i.E(;lSl.A'l'lVE IIlSTc )ltY Oli l ' l  ll;  (:I.~:AN 
r\llt I\LITJNDMENTS <)I' 1970, at 437 (1974). 
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Legslative history equated the adequacy or inadequacy of the government action 
with whether it was capable of requiring compliance. The Conference 
Committee changed the language of the Senate bill requiring the government "to 
institute enforcement proceedings . . . to abate such alleged violation" to the 
language of the enacted provision requiring the government to have 
"commenced and roe] &gently prosecuting a[n] . . . action . . . to require 
compliance . . . .""" We already have seen that when Congress spoke of abating 
a violation, it meant requiring compliance with the statute. The ultimate 
congressional language was more elegant than the Senate language from which 
it was derived, but the meaning of both is comparable and the Senate Report 
explains both."" The legislative history demonstrates congressional intent that 
the trial court determine a government action is adequate before it can bar a 
citizen suit, i.e., whether the government action is one capable of and calculated 
to require compliance. 
The Supreme Court seized on thls in Gwaltny ofSmithf;e/a', Ltd v. Chesapeake 
B q  Founhtion, Inc,"'%s one justification for holding that section 505 of the C\VA 
authorized citizen suits only to address continuing violations. It noted that the 
"provisions specifically provide that citizen suits are barred only if the 
Administtator.. . has commenced an action 'to require ~vmphnce."' This language 
supports our conclusion that the precluded citizen suit is also an action fir 
~'ompliance, rather than an action solely for civil penalties for past, nonrecurring 
 violation^."^"' The Seventh Circuit seized on similar language in section 7002 of 
the RCRA to support its holding that an EPA suit to abate violations barred a 
citizen suit to abate the same violations, although directed against dfferent 
defendants."" 
There are two aspects to the issue of whether a government action is one to 
require compliance. Oddly, few courts have considered either issue, probably 
because citizen plaintiffs have not focused on them. The first is the 
straightforward question of whether the government action is the type of action 
that can require compliance. If the government action is one seeking an 
101. For the language of the enacted provision, see section 304 of the (:,\I\, 42 U.S.C. 
S 76040(1)@) (2000). 
102. The Senate Report accompanying the Scnatc (:WA bill contains the same lanpuagc as the 
Senate lieport accompanying the Senate (ILL\ bill. CompanS. REP. No. 71-1 176, at 37, npritfcdin 
I\ I,EC;lsw\l'lVE 1-IISTORY <)PTI{E (:I,EAN 11111 /\hlliNDhlENTS 01' 1770, at 437 (1774), tvilh S. 1t171'. 
NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), npn'ntcdin 1772 I.I;.C;ISI.I\'ITVO IISI'OI~Y at 1478. Since the lankwage 
contained in the Senate CWr\ bill is the same as the language col~tai~led in the (:A,\ (:onfcrcncc 
(:ommittce bill, the quotcd language from the Scnatc R~por t  explains both vcrsions. 
103. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
104. Id. at 60 n.3 (second and third emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
105. Scc Supporters to Clppose l'ollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 I7.2d 1320,1323 (7th 
Cir. 1792) C'Noticc that this statute refers to an action to 'require compliance with such permit lor1 
regulation'-not an action against the private party's chosen adversary, but an action to require 
compliance.") (alteration in original). 
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injunction against the continued violation, the procedure is appropriate to 
preclude a citizen suit. The Court reminds us in Friend ofthe Earth, Inc. v. Lclidbw 
EnvimnmentalSey~i~~es (TOC), 1nl:"'"hat penalties as well'as injunctive relief may 
be used to coerce compliance. Of course, to deter violations, a penalty must 
recover from a violator more than the economic benefit it has realized from the 
violations."" Unless the government action is a traditionally recognized coercive 
device, it probably isn't one to require compliance. For instance, one court had 
little trouble holding that a memorandum of understanding between two state 
agencies was not an action to require cornplian~e."'~ Such an agreement is not 
coercive. Indeed, because it was an agreement between two parts of the same 
sovereign, it may not even have been enforceable as a contract. 
The second question is whether a government enforcement action is in fact 
being used to require compliance. The action must not only be capable of 
requiring compliance, it must be calculated to do so. Although the Court in 
Weinbetger v. Romem-Barcelo"" reminds us that there may be several forms of 
injunction that can lead to c~mpliance,~'" not all injunctions wd1 do so. The 
Second Circuit implicitly recognized this when determining that a citizen suit 
could continue after a subsequently filed state action was settled purportedly 
ending the violations alleged in the citizen suit. The court remanded the case for 
a determination of whether the settlement "caused the violations alleged by 
[plaintiff] to cease and eliminated any realistic prospect of their recurrence.""' 
If so, the citizen suit should be dismissed, if not, it should go forward. The 
decision was implicitly based on mootness. But it required the trial court on 
106. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
107. The district court in %&JV aptly noted that to serve as a deterrent, civil penalties must 
be in an amount "high enough to insure that polluters cmnot simply absorb the penalty as a cost 
of doing business." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. l i d l aw Envtl. Servs. (1'0(:), Inc., 890 1;. Supp. 
470.491-92 (D.S.C. 1995), vacated fy 149 I:.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), m'd, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
108. Pub. Interest Research (;coup of N.J., loc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822 1:. Supp. 174, 
184 0 .N.J .  1992) (finding that a memorandum of understanding between the state cnvirontncntal 
enforcement agcncy and the state expresbway authority was not an enforcement action and could 
not preclude a citizen suit). 
109. 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
110. The Court held that the district court was not mandated to issue nn injunction requiring 
thc Navy to cease discharging practice bombs into the waters of the United States without a (:WI\ 
permit, but could instead order the Navy to apply for a permit. I t  concluded that the (:Wr\ 
provided several means for a court to assure compliance. "An injunction is not the only means of 
ensuring compliance." Id at 314. 
Rather than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for ally and all 
statutory violations, the [<:W,\] permits the district court to ordcr that rclicf 
it co~lsidcrs necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act. 'Ihat rclicf 
can include, but is not limited to, an ordcr of immediate cessation. 
Id at  320. 
11 1. Atl. States I x p l  Found., Inc. v. I Jastman Kodak Co., 933 I:.2d 124,128 (2d (:ir. 1991). 
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remand to determine not only whether t l~e  state's settlement rendered the citizen 
suit moot, but also whether the settlement was complied with and whether it 
covered all of the violations alleged in the citizen suit."' Other courts have held 
that administtative actions do not bar citizen suits when they do not purport to 
or do  not in fact prevent the continuance of violations alleged in the citizen 
actions.""tates may use a common enforcement mechanism, such as an 
administrative compliance order, not as a compulsion to comply but as a means 
of extending a compliance date. Mere compliance extensions do not coerce 
compliance, even though they are contained in compliance orders.lI4 Of course, 
it may not be clear from the face of an order whether the state intends to compel 
compliance or merely extend a compliance date. Some courts may be hostile to 
such an i n q q . 1 1 5  Penalties also can coerce compliance, but only if they are 
punitive; for example, sufficient to do more than remove the economic benefits 
of non-compliance."" 
A government action may bar a citizen suit only for the common violations 
that the two actions seek to abate. For the government action to bar a citizen 
suit, the government action must seek "to require compliance with the standard, 
lunitation, or order.""' " [qhe standard, limitation, or order," to which section 
304@)(1)(B) refers, is the standard, h i ta t ion  or order the citizen alleges the 
defendant is violating under section 304(a)(l), the only prior use of the three 
terms in the section. I t  follows from the plain meaning of these terms and the 
e x p r e o  uniw canon of statutory construction"~hat the government action 
precludes a citizen suit only for the violations of the standard, lunitation or order 
that they both allege and seek to abate. Moreover, this result is consistent with 
the policy of the provision. The prior notice and the delay period elements of the 
preclusion were intended to g v e  the government the opportunity to enforce 
against the violations of the standard, limitation or order alleged by the citizen, 
unencumbered by a citizen suit. Where the government has enforced against 
some, but not all of such violations alleged by the citizen, it has foregone its 
opportunity to foreclose the citizen from enforcing against the violations the 
11 2. Eartmon Kohk, 933 1T.W at 128. 
113. Culbertson v. Coats Am., Inc., 913 1'. Supp. 1572,1579 (N.11. Ga. 1995); 1 ~ ) v c  v, N.Y. 
State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832,843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
114. See, e.g., Hishopv. Waterworks& Sanitary Sewer Hd.,No. CI\'.A. 00-I\-527-N, 2001 WI. 
46973 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16,2001); Culkrtso~l v. Coats Am., Inc., 913 1:. Supp. 1572.1579 (N.D. (;a. 
1995). 
115. Indeed, one court suggested a citizc~l plaintiffs arpmcnt that a11 admi~~istntivc 
compliance order was merely a compliance date cxtenio~l came closc to warranting a sanction 
undcr FED. R. Clv. P. 11. See Atl. States Lrpl Found., Inc. v. 'I'yson 1700ds, lnc.. 682 1'. Supp. 1186, 
1188 (N.D. Ala. 1988), m'don otbmgmunh, 897 1'.2d 1128 (11th (:u. 1990). 
116. SeeFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Sews. (I'(lC3, Inc.,890 T. Supp. 470,491- 
' 95 (D.S.C. 1995), varatedb 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cu. 1998), m'd, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
117. C h i  § 304@)(1)(R), 42 U.S.C. § 7604@)(1)(R) (2000) (emphasis added). 
11 8. See rqra note 5. 
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government chose to ignore. Most, but not all courts considering the issue have 
so held."" 
A variant of this issue arises when the defendant in a citizen suit under one 
statute argues a government action under another statute bars the citizen suit. 
Such government actions generally are not brought to require compliance with 
the same standards the citizen is enforcing against and generally will not bar the 
citizen suit,"" although there are decisions to the contrary."' Another variant is 
11 9. Berry v. Farmland Itldus., Inc., 114 1;. Supp. 2d 11 50, 11 56 (I). Kan. 2000) (finding that 
citizen suit claims that were not mentioned in an Ul'r\ consent decree were not resolved by decree's 
entry and not precluded undcr the CWA); Citi~ens L~pl Envtl. ~\ction Network, Inc. v. I'rcmlum 
Standard Farms, Inc., No. 97-6073-CV-SJ-6,2000 WL 220464, at *5 (W.D. Mo. I;cb. 23, 2000) 
(finding that the state's claim regarding defendant's permitted facility d t r s  not bar a claim akminst 
defendant's non-permitted facilities undcr the (:WJ\ and the CAI\); Hriggs & Stratton COT. v. 
Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 1;. Supp. 2d 1356,1373-74 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (finding the terms of a state 
agency's consent decree did not affect a plaintiffs right to pursue a claim under the R(:RI\); 
Neighbors for a 'Toxic I k e  Cmty. v. \'ulcan Materials (10.. 964 1;. Supp. 1448, 1451 -52 (I). (:ole. 
1997) (finding that an BPI\ action for violatio~ls of the reporting rcquucmc~lts of the (:liR(:1,1\ 
docs not bar a citizcn action for violations of the reporting requirements of the 131'(:IM); l~rilling 
v. Vill. of i\nna, 924 1;. Supp. 821,836 (S.1). Ohio 1996) (finding that citizen suits arc "barred only 
if the State commences a civil action to r~yuirc ompliance with thc somr stanhd.  . . referenced in 
the plaintiffs 60-day notice"); Glazer v. Am. Ucology Bnvtl. Scrvs. Corp., 894 1:. Supp. 1029,1036 
F.D. Tcx. 1995) (finding violations of thc (:r\A and thc RCRi\, which werc addressed in thc citizcn 
suit but not in the state's suit, were not barrcd in the citizcn suit); l'ub. Interest lles~yrch (;roup, 
Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., CIV. No. 89-3146,1990 WL 661 78,at *4 (D.N.J. May 17,1990) (finding 
that the defendant must establish a state action for "identical claims" a citizen suit alleges to 
pmclude the citizen suit); Hudson Rivcr Rshcrmen's Ass'n v. County of Westchcstcr, 686 I;. Supp. 
1044, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that citizen suits arc not precluded when m on-F)ing 
government enforcement effort "does not address the factual pievanccs asserted by lthcl private 
attorneys general."); Md. Waste (:oalition v. SChf Gorp., 616 F. Supp. 1474,1483 (D. Md. 1985) 
(finding that section 304 of the CIL\ bars a citizcn suit where a previously filed p>vcrnmcnt 
enforcement action seeks compliance "with the same standard[sJ" and at the same emission sources, 
although the two actions were based on violations o n  different dates); ln~vc v. N.Y. State Dep't of 
Envtl. Conservation, 529 1:. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (hding that on-~w)ingadministntivc action 
against a defendant does not constitute a bar to a citizen suit undcr the <:Wt\). Bntsee /\rk. Wtldlife 
Pcd'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (ED. Ark. 1993) (finding that the stLte 
agency's actions and penalties ahpinst the defendant "cover dl violations of which plaintiff could 
possibly complai n" and so, preclude the citken suit), @d, 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994); t\tl. States 
Leffl Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 1:. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (finding that an 
administrative order requiring future action covered prospective violations under section 309w of 
the CWA), m'd on othcrgmnnrir, 897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1990); Conn. Fund for the Ilnv't v. 
Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. (:onn. 1986) (finding a citizcn suit was precluded by 
the state's diligent prosecution of its cnforccment suit apinst the same alleged polluter). 
120. Brigs & Stntton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 1:. Supp. 2d 1356,1373-74 (M.1). 
Ga. 1998); Neighbors for a Toxic Free Cmty. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 964 P. Supp. 1448 0. (:ole. 
1997) (finding that an EPA (:ERCLr\ action doesn't bar a RCRA citizens suit); Murray v. Hath Iron 
Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33 (I). Me. 1994) (finding that a state suit to enforce its hazardous waste 
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whether a citizen suit may go forward when both the citizen suit and the 
government action seek to enforce the same requirement, but the actions allege 
violations of the requirement at lfferent times. Courts generally hold that the 
citizen suit may proceed on continuing violations not enforced against by the 
government a ~ t i 0 n . I ~ ~  
Congress enacted broad authority for citizen suits to promote compliance with 
environmental law and to provide for citizen participation in environmental 
protection. It qualified this broad authority with the preclusion device, one 
element of which is the dtligent prosecution bar. The purposes of the authority 
and the qualification to it are not altogether complimentary, and are the result of 
compromise. While the best indicia of congressional intent is normally the words 
it wrote, that is particularly true when the provision, such as the citizen suit 
provision, is the result of compromising multiple divergent goals. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the theme and variations nature of the preclusion 
device, a device that Congress repeated in the citizen suit provisions of each of 
the environmental statutes, but repeated with variations to express different 
balances between its purposes and qualifications. The citizen suit provisions, 
then, are best interpreted by reference to their plain English meaning. 
law didn't bar a CWA citizen suit); I-h~dson River 1;ishermcn's Ass'n v. (Iounty of Wcstchcstcr, 686 
1:. Supp. 1044,1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a federal enforcement of the Rcfusc ,\ct consent 
decree, requiring proper operation and closure of landfills, didn't require compliance with the (IWh 
prohibition of addition of leachnte through a point source to navipble water without a permit). 
121. United States v. C;urley Ref. Co., 43 It.3d 1188 (8th (:u. 1994); I-Iudson IGvcrkeepcr 
I:und, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastinp Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Sierra Club v. Cola. 
Ref. Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1994). 
122. See Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 1;. Supp. 1186 (N.D. /\la. 
1988), m'n on other gmnndr, 897 1;.2d 1128 (1 1 th Cir. 1990); (:hesapcake Hay I:ound., Inc. v. 
Hethlehcm Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987); Md. Waste Coalition v. SCM Gorp., 616 
1;. Supp. 1474,1483 (D. Md. 1985). Bntsee t\tl. States LC@ ITound., Inc. v. IZastman Kodak (Io., 
933 I7.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991). 'There, the Second (:ircuit r ~ r d s  GwaItney to bar citizen suits for 
penalties "the government has elected to forego." Id at 127. 'This is a c l~ r r  misreading of Gwaltney, 
which held only that citizens could not suc for wh(1l1y past violations. 'I'hc Court in Gwakny used 
an ill-conceived hypothetical of a citien suit seeking pc~laltics apinst a violator when the 
government had earlier foregone penalties in exchange for the violator installing controls beyond 
those required by the statute, to justify its holding that citizens could only sue for wholly past 
violations. See Gwaltney of Smithficld, Ltd. v. Chcsaprslke Hay I:ound., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,60-61 
(1987). The hypothetical was not the holding of thc case. Indeed, it did not support the holding 
because even under that holding, the citizen suit could have been brought wins t  contitluing 
violations while the violator was installing the agreed upon controls. See L ~ v c  v. N.Y. State Dcp't 
of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.1I.N.Y. 1981). 
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Most courts have used a plain English meaning interpretation of most issues 
arising under the provisions, with straightforward and compatible results. A plain 
English interpretation of the issues examined here prevents citizens from filing 
suit only if the government has already taken action to require compliance and 
that action is pending and being diligently prosecuted. This interpretation flows 
dlrectly from the words used by Congress in the citizen suit provisions andis 
supported by their legislative history. The interpretation assures a vibrant use of 
citizen suits to secure compliance with pollution control statutes. I t  also 
preserves the unfettered ability of government enforcers to prosecute any 
violator, and do it Free ofwhatever complications citizen sGts may cause, as long 
as the prosecutor moves with reasonable dispatch to secure compliance. 
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